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Human Security in Southeast Asia: 
20 Years in Review
Surin Pitsuwan and Mely Caballero-Anthony
The concept of human security gained prominence in Southeast Asia in the 
aftermath of the Asian financial crisis of 1997-1998. In a rapidly changing ASEAN, 
the list of human insecurities covers issues of both development and security, 
and fall within the ambit of both freedom from want and freedom from fear. But 
while human security has gained traction 20 years since the 1994 UNDP Human 
Development Report, more needs to be done to translate discourse into action. 
This article argues that in order to advance human security ASEAN states must be 
imbued with the political will to act decisively in addressing human insecurities and 
to work with other actors in promoting protection and empowerment of people and 
communities.
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Introduction
The concept of human security has made significant advances since it was first 
promulgated in the United Nations Development Programme’s (UNDP) Human 
Development Report of 1994. The report, which was largely inspired by the work 
of Mahbub ul Haq, advocated shifting the security reference from the nation-
state to individuals and communities. As one of the pioneering advocates of 
human security, Haq had argued for a new concept of security “that is reflected 
in the lives of the people, not in the weapons of our country” (Haq 1994, 1). 
According to Haq, security should be interpreted as “security of people, not just 
security of territory; security of individuals, not just security of nations; security 
through development, not security through arms; and security of all the people 
everywhere—in their homes, in their jobs, in their streets, in their communities, 
in their environment” (ibid.). In its simplest form, human security is therefore 
about protecting individuals. It goes to the very heart of the questions “security 
Asian Journal of Peacebuilding  Vol. 2  No. 2 (2014): 199-215
doi: 10.18588/201411.000028 Special Issue Article
© 2014 The Institute for Peace and Unification Studies, Seoul National University
ISSN 2288-2693 Print, ISSN 2288-2707 Online
200 Surin Pitsuwan and Mely Caballero-Anthony
for whom?” and “whose security?”
The 1994 UNDP Human Development Report, which offered the first 
operationalization of the human security concept, outlines two main aspects of 
human security. Human security means “first, safety from such chronic threats 
as hunger, disease and repression. And second, it means protection from sudden 
and hurtful disruptions in the patterns of daily life—whether in homes, in jobs or 
in communities.” The report further identifies seven elements of human security, 
namely, economic security, food security, health security, environmental security, 
personal security, community security, and political security. Given the breadth of 
the UNDP’s operation, the truncated version—“freedom from fear and freedom 
from want”—became the more common definition of human security (UNDP 
1994, 23).
Although the human security concept has generated robust policy debate 
and controversy since its inception, and has inspired significant academic 
research, traction within the domestic and foreign policies of states remains 
elusive. Such is the paradox of human security: while the concept makes for a 
compelling normative framework to guide the focus of security from the state to 
individuals and communities, progress on moving it beyond discourse to action 
has been less than impressive. The paradox becomes even more interesting given 
the rising resonance of the concept in many international meetings over the 
course of the last 20 years. There is also the greater realization and appreciation 
that human security issues—be they economic, food, health, or environmental 
security—are critical to national security. More significantly, there is certainly 
a growing constituency of actors, both state and non-state, advocating human 
security as an effective framework for addressing many of the security challenges 
confronting the international community at large. In 1998, for example, a group 
of like-minded foreign ministers of a few countries came together and formed 
among themselves the Human Security Network (HSN). Under the leadership 
of Knut Vollebaek of Norway and Lloyd Axworthy of Canada, the Network 
began an active advocacy of the human security concept in various fora of the 
world. And they have made some impressive progress in their cause. This is best 
reflected in the 2005 United Nations report entitled In Larger Freedom. Former 
UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan explains:
When the UN Charter speaks of “larger freedom,” it includes the basic political 
freedoms to which all human beings are entitled. But it also goes beyond them, 
encompassing what President Franklin Roosevelt called “freedom from want” and 
“freedom from fear.” Both our security and our principles have long demanded 
that we push forward all these frontiers of freedom, conscious that progress on 
one depends on and reinforces progress on the others. In the last 60 years, rapid 
technological advances, increasing economic interdependence, globalization, and 
dramatic geopolitical change have made this imperative only more urgent (Annan 
2005). 
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Against this background, the aim of this article is to assess the progress in the 
mainstreaming of human security in Asia, particularly in Southeast Asia. We 
examine the ways in which the human security narrative has evolved and has 
been diffused in Southeast Asia, and importantly, the extent to which human 
security has actually taken hold in the region. We are particularly interested in 
the degree to which human security has become the strategic framework driving 
the security agenda of Southeast Asia, and the Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations (ASEAN) more particularly. In doing so, we argue that 20 years since the 
appearance of the concept of human security in the Human Development Report, 
and following the formation of the Human Security Network in 1998, it could 
well be that the imperative of advancing human security is more a matter of 
generating political will and finding innovative ways to promote the concept than 
of finding compelling reasons for why human security matters. 
Human Security Then
Scholars have generally described the evolution of human security over the last 
20 years in terms of two phases. The first phase began in 1997 when the emergent 
concept was embraced by the Japanese and Canadian governments and made 
part of their official foreign policies. While the two countries were regarded as the 
first generation advocates of human security, one can differentiate between their 
two approaches.
The Canadian approach has been more focused on the freedom-from-fear 
aspect of human security. This was clearly reflected in a foreign policy document 
which stated that human security “in essence, means safety for people from both 
violent and non-violent threats … a condition or state of being characterized 
by freedom from pervasive threats to people’s rights, their safety, or even their 
lives” (DFAIT 2000). The specific emphasis on freedom from fear seemed to 
have stemmed from the images of human violence and misery in African states 
such as Rwanda, Somalia, and Sierra Leone. These were shameful scars on the 
international community’s efforts to respond and vivid illustrations of its failure 
to avert human violence and catastrophe. From this perspective, human security 
is aimed at reducing conflicts, preventing mass atrocities, and protecting people 
from physical threats to their safety and well-being.
The Japanese approach is tuned more towards freedom from want. As 
articulated by former Japanese Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi, human security 
is “the key which comprehensively covers all the menaces that threaten the 
survival, daily life, and dignity of human beings and strengthens all efforts to 
confront those threats” (Obuchi 1998). Among the menaces that were outlined 
were environmental degradation, violations of human rights, transnational 
organized crime, illicit drugs, refugees, poverty, anti-personnel landmines, and 
202 Surin Pitsuwan and Mely Caballero-Anthony
infectious diseases such as AIDS (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan 1999). 
An obvious difference between Japan’s approach and that of Canada is the 
comprehensive listing of human security threats. The Japanese perspective is that 
the current world situation has brought about a “diversification of threats,” and 
the development of the idea of human security signifies recognition of the many 
threats to the dignity and survival of individual human beings. Thus, “human 
security can only be ensured when the individual is confident of a life free of fear 
and free of want” through an inclusive agenda addressing human needs (Takasu 
2000).
The lack of convergence on the definition of what exactly should be the focus 
of human security extended beyond policy circles to the academic community. 
The main critique was that the concept was too broad and unnecessarily vague 
(Paris 2001; Liotta and Owen 2006). As one report noted, unless one focuses on 
specific issues human security as a concept loses its utility (Harvard University 
Conflict Resolution Project 2000). Sverre Lodgaard (2001) was among many 
writers who argued for a narrower definition of human security confined to 
“vulnerability to physical violence during conflict.” Similarly, Astri Suhrke (1999) 
argued that human security should focus only on “vulnerability” as its defining 
feature, which in this instance would refer to three categories of victims: those of 
war and internal conflict; those living at or below subsistence levels; and those 
who are victims of natural disasters. To these analysts, the concept of human 
security would be best served if it were to be confined to freedom from fear 
of man-made physical violence, referred to as direct, personal violence. This 
perspective is very close to the Canadian approach to human security which 
privileges the notion of freedom from fear.
Other scholars preferred a more flexible interpretation of the human 
security concept. One definition sought to view the “bases of [human] security 
as a comprehensive and integrated matrix of needs and rights, from which all 
individual and social values can flourish and be optimized” (van Ginkel and 
Newman 2000). There was also an earlier attempt to conceptualise human 
security by identifying the “objective—the ultimate ends—of all security 
concerns” as “human survival, well-being and freedom” (Chen 1995, 137-145).
The Canadian focus on freedom from fear led to its sponsorship of the 
International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) which 
introduced the concept of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) in its 2001 report. 
R2P advanced the idea of “sovereignty as responsibility.” It framed the contending 
issues of sovereignty and intervention in terms of the responsibility to protect. 
The central proposition of the ICISS report was this: 
•  State sovereignty implies responsibility, and the primary responsibility for the 
protection of its people lies with the state itself.
•  Where a population is suffering serious harm as a result of internal war, insurgency, 
 Human Security in Southeast Asia 203
repression or state failure, and the state in question is unwilling or unable to halt or 
avert it, the principle of non-intervention yields to the international responsibility to 
protect (ICISS 2001, xi).
The bold, yet innovative, semantic crafting of “sovereignty as responsibility” drew 
a mixed response from the international community. Many states, particularly 
those in Asia, were skeptical of R2P—with some perceiving the notion as a 
Trojan horse for stronger states to intervene in the affairs of weaker states. 
Nevertheless, the idea that a state can be held responsible for its failure to protect 
its own citizens from human rights atrocities was a dramatic departure from the 
sacrosanct principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of states. 
Thus, even as the human security concept was being hailed as the 
paradigm most reflective of the security challenges of the post-Cold War era, 
the first attempts at promoting it in the global community met with resistance. 
Nevertheless, the efforts did create enough momentum to generate critical 
support for its broad objectives. The language of human security became an 
important point of reference for a growing constituency of countries and civil 
society groups. These actors pushed for human security to be the new paradigm 
for setting the global security agenda. The aim was to elevate human security to 
the strategic level, as a driver of security policy and as a compelling framework 
for multilateral cooperation. 
One important constituency has been the Human Security Network (HSN) 
established in 1999 by Norway in partnership with the Canadian and Swiss 
governments.1 The HSN identified 10 important issues for the human security 
agenda, namely, anti-personnel landmines, small arms, children in armed 
conflict, international humanitarian and human rights law, international criminal 
proceedings, exploitation of children, safety of humanitarian personnel, conflict 
prevention, transnational organized crime, and resources for development 
(Human Security Network 1999, 2-4).
And, while several countries in Asia were initially skeptical of the concept 
of human security, the Japanese government initiated the establishment of the 
Commission on Human Security (CHS) in 2001.2 A critical mission of the 
Commission was to define the concept and the agenda of human security more 
clearly, and in turn, promote greater understanding of the concept given the 
concerns at that time about the implications for state sovereignty and the non-
interference principle. Co-chaired by Sadako Ogata of Japan and Professor 
Amartya Sen, a Nobel Laureate in Economics, the Commission issued the report 
Human Security Now, which described human security as encompassing both 
freedoms—freedom from want and fear, as well as freedom to live in dignity. 
The significant inclusion of “freedom to live in dignity” was to stress the facet of 
empowerment, which enables individuals and communities to protect themselves 
against the range of human security threats that they face. The findings of the 
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Commission reflected the combined perspectives of protection for people under 
threats (Ogata’s emphasis) and human development and empowerment (Sen’s 
emphasis).
From the above developments, two observations can be made. First, the 
initial attempt to socialize the concept of human security in the international 
community generated more division than convergence on the objectives of 
human security. Aside from the criticism that human security was too broad 
and unnecessarily vague, there was also the split between those that preferred a 
narrower definition of human security—i.e. freedom from fear—and those that 
were more comfortable with a more development-oriented notion of human 
security that emphasized the impact of poverty, food, and health insecurity, 
among others, particularly on the poor, women, children and the elderly—that 
is, on the most vulnerable sections of society. Underpinning this division is the 
question of whether human security should include the possibility of the use of 
force through humanitarian intervention to protect individuals from threats of 
physical violence. As noted earlier, the introduction of R2P only heightened this 
concern. 
Second, despite the divisions, efforts at promoting human security continued, 
with more attention given not only to bridging the gap in the understanding 
and application of the concept, but also to advancing human security as a useful 
policy framework in defining areas for multilateral cooperation at various levels 
in the international arena. Japan, together with Slovenia and Thailand, has been 
leading this effort through the United Nations Trust Fund for Human Security. 
Among the areas that have been identified are developmental assistance and 
humanitarian projects. In brief, efforts to mainstream human security continued 
despite the skepticism and criticisms. The seeds of human security had been 
planted, and slowly but surely, the language of human security began to creep 
into the security lexicon of some parts of the global community. This ushered in 
the second phase in the development of the human security concept.
Human Security Now 
As discussed above, the challenges that confronted the promotion of human 
security did not deter its advocates from pushing ahead with the goals of 
mainstreaming the concept in the security practices of states. After a decade 
of advocacy, the most visible impact was the European Union’s (EU) adoption 
of the 2004 Barcelona Report, entitled A Human Security Doctrine for Europe 
(Study Group on Europe’s Security Capabilities 2004). The report supported 
the notion of human security as the security doctrine underpinning the EU’s 
external relations, citing three reasons: first, morality (all human life is equal 
and all humans have the right to live in security and with dignity); second, legal 
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(there is universal acceptance of promoting and protecting human security and 
human rights); and third, enlightened self-interest (the EU’s interest can be met 
by addressing the insecurities of an interconnected world). This was followed by 
the 2007 Madrid Report, A European Way of Security, which aimed to add more 
depth to the EU’s human security doctrine in pragmatic and institutional terms, 
with more focus given to crisis management, conflict prevention, and civil-
military cooperation (Human Security Study Group 2007). While not without its 
own challenges and detractors, some EU countries (Finland, for example) have 
used their presidency of the EU to push human security forward. Despite the 
notable progress owing largely to the efforts of the EU’s epistemic communities, 
it has been observed that the full thrust of the human security doctrine has yet to 
be fully seen in the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy (Christou 2014).
At the UN, two developments are salient as indicators of progress in 
advancing the human security concept: inclusion of the concept in UN 
proceedings and elaboration of the R2P principle. Following the 2003 Report 
of the Commission on Human Security, the Japanese government convened a 
Friends of Human Security (FHS) meeting aimed at disseminating the concept 
and keeping up the momentum of discussions of human security at UN fora. 
The efforts paid off in 2010. The UN Secretary-General’s report in June that 
year reflected the first formal discussion of human security at the UN General 
Assembly. The report was followed by a UN General Assembly resolution on 
human security in July 2011. In April 2012, a second report by the UN Secretary-
General on human security was released which offered a common understanding 
of the concept. The 2012 report, which was adopted by the UN General Assembly 
in September 2012, proposed that human security include freedom from fear and 
freedom from want, as well as a protection and empowerment framework quite 
distinct from the notion of R2P (UN General Assembly 2012).
Meanwhile, the debate on R2P had also progressed significantly following 
its first iteration in 2001, and it gained widespread international acceptance at the 
World Summit in 2005. However, the notion of R2P adopted in 2005 had a starkly 
different articulation from that advanced by the ICISS report. The basic premise 
of the 2005 R2P is that each state bears the responsibility to protect its citizenry 
from genocide, ethnic cleansing, war crimes, and crimes against humanity. 
While one notes that the reformulated version of R2P is much narrower in 
scope and applies only to four atrocity crimes, it nevertheless represents a 
significant normative shift in that it focuses on the victims of atrocities, with 
states, singularly, and the international community, as a collective, responsible 
for developing national and international measures to protect populations from 
grave and unconscionable harm. Hence, in the case of a state either manifestly 
unable or unwilling to discharge its responsibility to safeguard its populace 
from genocide and mass atrocities, the responsibility to protect beleaguered 
populations lies with the international community as a whole. 
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In sum, the second phase of human security saw notable progress beyond 
the debate on what the concept means to disseminating and developing the 
concept as a useful policy framework in addressing a slew of human security 
challenges. The key challenges moving forward then are, first, how to convince 
states to usefully apply the human security approach in their own domestic and 
foreign policies, and second, how states can work with a broad spectrum of actors 
to address the range of insecurities besetting their own communities.
Human Security in Southeast Asia: Mapping Points of Inflection 
The narrative on Southeast Asia’s attitudes toward, and interpretations of, human 
security in many ways mirrors the development and progress of the concept 
at the global level. What started as a cautious stance in the region on human 
security evolved into a more nuanced position influenced largely by the changing 
security dynamics in the region and beyond.
While human security has been regarded by many in ASEAN as a novel 
concept, one could argue that many of its elements are actually complementary 
to the region’s own notion of “comprehensive security.” Within the framework of 
comprehensive security, security “goes beyond (but does not exclude) the military 
threats to embrace the political, economic and socio-cultural dimensions” 
(Alagappa 1998, 624). As an ASEAN security analyst points out, the region has 
always regarded security as multi-dimensional and comprehensive in nature, as 
reflected in many ASEAN documents including the ASEAN Concord of 1976, 
and ASEAN’s Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia, also signed in 
1976 (Hassan 1995). 
Against the region’s notion of comprehensive security, human security 
is not necessarily an alien concept (Acharya and Acharya 2000). Yet, while 
comprehensive security indeed offers a broader conceptualization of security, it 
is still very much state-centric in nature—the security reference is still the state 
and not individuals and communities. Hence, in Southeast Asia, comprehensive 
security was for a long time associated with the notion of security of regimes 
from all possible threats. The privileging of state security also meant that issues 
of human rights and human security were secondary to concerns about regime 
security. This was particularly the case for authoritarian regimes in ASEAN. 
And so it was not unusual that, as the discourses on human security filtered 
through the region, many officials claimed its lack of relevance, particularly when 
the idea of R2P emerged. During that period, the regional security environment 
was often described as benign largely due to ASEAN. It was ASEAN that turned 
Southeast Asia from what could have been the Balkans of the East into one of the 
more peaceful and economically prosperous regions in the world. One would 
often hear ASEAN officials—and even the region’s political elites—declare that an 
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R2P-like crisis could not conceivably happen in ASEAN. What was not discussed 
was the fact that one of the most tragic human atrocity cases happened in 
Southeast Asia’s own backyard: In Cambodia, approximately two million people 
were killed between 1976 and 1979 under the Khmer Rouge regime.
Asian Financial Crisis
It took the impact of the Asian financial crisis (1997–1999) for human security 
to find some traction—at least in the policy discourses in the region. The region’s 
experience during the crisis revealed how, in an interconnected world, a financial 
crisis can easily spiral into a contagious crisis of magnified proportions, and 
within a short period of time. There have already been numerous published 
studies detailing the impact of the 1997 Asian financial crisis (e.g., JCIE 1998; 
World Bank 1998), but briefly, the nature and range of the impacts are highlighted 
below.
•  Threat of economic collapse: While countries in the region were affected to varying 
degrees depending on their specific circumstances, in general, the crisis dealt 
a severe blow to economies, as seen in massive public and private debt, rising 
inflation, massive unemployment, and economic dislocation. At the height of 
the crisis ASEAN currencies depreciated by 30–40 per cent. And in the case of 
Indonesia, the rupiah depreciated at one time by as much as 80 per cent.
•  Breakdown of public order in response to ethnic tensions: The impact of economic 
crisis threatened the social fabric of multi-ethnic societies in ASEAN. This was seen 
in Indonesia when ethnic Chinese bore the brunt of public unrest in the wake of the 
unexpected economic downturn. The crisis also triggered ethnic tensions between 
Christians and Muslims in the Indonesian provinces of the Moluccas and West 
Papua.
•  Loss of political legitimacy and pressure for political change: In Indonesia, the 
Suharto regime of 33 years was brought down within less than a year of the onset of 
the economic crisis, while other governments in the region faced serious challenges, 
as in the cases of Malaysia and Thailand. 
•  Increased labor migration and tensions between ASEAN states: The sudden 
economic downturn led to a mass exodus of labor migrants who had sought 
livelihoods within and across national borders. Migration is often seen as a people’s 
crisis but it can also contribute to bilateral state crises. The repatriation of migrant 
workers led to bilateral tensions, for instance, between Malaysia and Indonesia with 
regard to Indonesian foreign workers in Malaysia, between Thailand and Myanmar 
with regard to Myanmar foreign workers in Thailand, and between Indonesia and 
Singapore with regard to Indonesian foreign workers in Singapore.
•  Rising incidence of domestic violence and social problems: This was particularly 
apparent among the communities whose livelihoods were severely affected by the 
crisis.
None of the affected ASEAN countries had anticipated the severity of the impacts 
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nor the flow-on effects on the security of their respective regimes. The notion that 
comprehensive security may no longer be adequate to meet emerging challenges 
like the 1997 financial crisis certainly led to some soul-searching in the policy 
communities in the region. The impetus to rethink security was best encapsulated 
in a speech by the then Thai foreign minister in which he stated: “I am proposing 
… that we here at the [Post Ministerial Conference] consider setting up an 
ASEAN-PMC Caucus on Human Security [for] mapping out steps and strategies 
for long-term approach to the cure for and prevention of ‘human insecurity’ in 
our region” (Pitsuwan 1998).
The 1997 crisis galvanised disparate efforts by a number of civil society 
organizations which had for some time been critical of the region’s state-centric 
approach to security. During the height of the crisis, the language of human 
security resounded from the many voices of civil society groups across ASEAN 
urging their own governments to adopt human security as the new framework 
guiding national policies in both development and security. The call for a 
rethinking of security became more resonant as the region experienced more 
convulsions.
Multiple Humanitarian Crises
In the 10-year period after the concept of human security was first introduced in 
1994, Southeast Asia was hit by a number of crises apart from the Asian financial 
crisis. There were humanitarian crises resulting from the political upheavals in 
East Timor in 1999; the emergence of new transborder security threats such as 
transnational crime (drug trafficking and human smuggling); environmental 
crises (haze episodes); health crises resulting from the severe acute respiratory 
syndrome (SARS) pandemic in 2003 and Avian flu in 2009; and “new” terrorism 
and extremism threats triggered by the September 2001 terrorist attacks in the 
United States. The region witnessed even more devastating human security crises 
with the 2004 earthquake and tsunami which saw the loss of nearly a quarter of 
a million lives. And, just as ASEAN was coming to grips with the multiple types 
of crises confronting the region, one of its member states, Myanmar, had its own 
Saffron Revolution in 2007, which saw a series of violent demonstrations led by 
the country’s Buddhist monks against the military regime resulting in a number 
of civilian deaths. A year later, in 2008, cyclone Nargis killed thousands in the 
country, a disaster aggravated by the perceived indifference of the ruling regime 
to the victims. 
The series of crises experienced by the region represented critical points 
of inflection for ASEAN member states to seriously assess the then pervasive 
view that the notions of human security and R2P were not relevant to ASEAN. 
Subsequently, ASEAN crafted a vision of an ASEAN Community anchored 
by three pillars: the ASEAN Political-Security Community (APSC), ASEAN 
Economic Community (AEC), and ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community (ASCC). 
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This vision was geared toward building a community that is people-centered, and 
where the populace live in a “just, democratic and harmonious environment” 
defined by “shared prosperity” and a “caring and sharing community” (ASEAN 
2009). This response reflected an evolving development within the regional 
association to be more pro-active in addressing human security issues.
In fact, ASEAN’s collective engagement in the East Timorese crisis of 1999, 
the humanitarian assistance to victims of the Indian Ocean tsunami of 2004, and 
the relief and reconstruction efforts in post-Cyclone Nargis in Myanmar of 2008 
could all be said to reflect human security considerations, at least in the minds of 
ASEAN leaders and officials. 
A closer look at the APSC Blueprint document (adopted in 2009) reveals 
a number of policy initiatives and measures developed to address a host of 
emerging regional security challenges. The Blueprint sets out five strategic thrusts 
aimed at bringing ASEAN’s political and security cooperation to a “higher plane” 
where states can work more closely to address transnational issues and ensure 
the safety and well-being of their societies. These are conflict prevention, conflict 
resolution, post-conflict peace building, political development, and norm shaping 
and sharing.3 
Aside from the APSC, ASEAN also adopted a Charter, in 2007, that codified 
the norms of inter- and intra-state conduct, including respect for fundamental 
freedoms and the promotion and protection of human rights. This was followed 
by the establishment of the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human 
Rights (AICHR) in 2009 and the ASEAN Commission on the Promotion and 
Protection of the Rights of Women and Children (ACWC) in 2010. Arguably, 
these regional institutions present opportunities for the promotion of human 
security by, among other things, embedding a human rights culture in ASEAN, 
developing conflict prevention norms in the region, as well as encouraging the 
development of the capacity of states to prevent and respond to the various 
protection concerns that might affect the security of individuals and communities 
within ASEAN. With these institutions, it could very well be that human security 
and the principles of R2P are starting to be demystified and advances are being 
made toward the ultimate goal of mainstreaming human security practices in the 
region.
Whither Human Security in the ASEAN Community in 2015 and 
Beyond?
Many observers have commended the significant progress that ASEAN has 
achieved in building regional capacity to address the different types of security 
challenges. The ASEAN of today, compared with that of a decade ago, has 
certainly come a long way in building up its image as a credible regional body. 
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From a weakened institution after the 1997 Asian financial crisis, ASEAN is now 
claiming its centrality in the regional multilateral security architecture. Yet, we 
argue that as far as institutionalizing human security in its security practices, for a 
number of reasons ASEAN still has a long way to go.
First, much work needs to be done to ensure the economic security of its 
population of 600 million. Narrowing the development gaps within ASEAN 
remains an elusive goal with a large percentage of the region’s population still 
living below the poverty line. Two of the ten ASEAN countries are still among 
the poorest in the world, with per capita gross domestic product (GDP) of less 
than US $1,000 (IEA 2013). From the perspective of freedom from want, meeting 
basic needs is still a huge challenge. For instance, more than 130 million people 
in Southeast Asia still do not have access to electricity; a vast majority of them 
live in rural or remote areas (ibid.). Such lack of access to energy is particularly 
detrimental to local communities whose freedom from food and economic 
insecurity are compromised as a result.
Second, in a post-Charter ASEAN, there continue to be a number of 
communities that suffer acute insecurities, including displacement, as a result of 
ongoing conflicts as demonstrated by the data in Table 1. 
Although there are efforts by concerned governments to find a political 
solution to the different conflicts—with some showing progress, as in the case of 
the recently inked peace agreement between the government of the Philippines 
and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF)—they have already exacted a high 
toll on the lives of people in the affected communities in the region. In Southern 
Thailand, unrest among the Malay-Muslim population has led to conflict with the 
government that has cost over 6,000 lives since January 2004. Human insecurity 
remains a real challenge for the ethnic minority in a mainly Buddhist state.
Aside from these conflicts, there is also the insecurity of certain minority 
groups such as the Rohingya communities in Myanmar. As non-citizens, 
Table 1. Displaced Persons in Myanmar, Philippines, Indonesia and Thailand (2013)
Internally displaced Persons Refugees Stateless Persons
Myanmar 632,000 415,343(from Myanmar) 808,075
Philippines 16,905 - 6,015
Indonesia 170,000(1) 15,168(from Indonesia)
Thailand - 82,460(most from Myanmar) 506,197
Note: (1) 2011.
Sources: UNHCR 2013; for Indonesia, International Displacement Monitoring Centre 2011.
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Rohingyas are deprived of many fundamental rights, including freedom of 
movement, education, marriage, and employment. They are also exposed to 
human rights violations such as arbitrary detention, forced labor, rape, torture, 
and forcible relocation. Until the plight of the Rohingyas is addressed, the issue 
will continue to be a blight on ASEAN’s goal of realizing a political and security 
community that is just, tolerant, and democratic. 
The complex ethnic and religious make-up of some countries in the region 
has created flashpoints for the discrimination and marginalization of some groups 
by others. In some cases, states have been responsible for the discrimination 
against minority groups, or at least, been complicit in the violence perpetrated 
against them. Threaded through these narratives is the link between conflict and 
development. Conflict-affected areas are among the worst performers in terms of 
poverty and human development. As long as conflict exists, it will be difficult to 
narrow the development gap. Without stability, the cycle of poverty will continue. 
Although poverty has seldom been the primary reason for the grievances in 
the various areas, the insecurities created by poverty may act as a multiplier to 
conflicts. Within such a context of conflict and instability, it is difficult to narrow 
the development gaps, an agenda seen as an integral dimension of the ASEAN 
Community. 
Third, as ASEAN continues to deepen economic integration, there are also 
the multiple insecurities faced by people on the move, such as the thousands 
of migrant workers that are vulnerable and in need of protection from human 
rights abuses and violence. While ASEAN has made some strides through the 
2007 ASEAN Declaration on the Protection and Promotion of the Rights of 
Migrant Workers, this convention will remain weak unless all countries that are 
host to migrant workers observe and protect the rights of these communities. 
Importantly, protection becomes a challenge as long as host countries that are 
unable to provide protection hide behind the cloak of non-interference.
Fourth, there are the complex human insecurities brought on by the 
increasingly frequent natural disasters such as cyclones and earthquakes. As the 
global environment adjusts to the new normal of intense weather patterns, the 
ASEAN region’s vulnerability to more frequent cyclones of severe magnitude 
becomes more acute. This means that more people in ASEAN will need better 
protection from natural disasters, which in turn demands increased efforts by 
governments to build greater capacity to make their communities more disaster-
resilient.
These four reasons are certainly not exhaustive. In a rapidly changing 
ASEAN, the list of human insecurities covers both the issues of development 
and security, and falls within the ambit of both freedom from want and freedom 
from fear. Thus, against the range of security challenges facing ASEAN, there 
are strongly compelling reasons to adopt a human security approach and use 
the concept as a guiding framework for national and regional policies. There is 
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also no reason why the principles of R2P, particularly the principle of conflict 
prevention, cannot be institutionalized in the region. It is noteworthy that since 
2005 several ASEAN member countries have already engaged in the ongoing 
development of the R2P principle through their respective contributions to the 
informal dialogues of the UN General Assembly as well as participation in the 
Group of Friends of R2P. But more should certainly be done to promote the 
principles of conflict prevention and move toward advancing mechanisms for 
conflict management and resolution if ASEAN is to give substance to creating a 
community in Southeast Asia, with human security as its overarching framework.
Conclusion
We began this article acknowledging that human security has achieved important 
milestones. Since the 1994 UNDP Report, and following the 1998 Lysøen 
Declaration that served as the global compact among a coalition of governments 
to work together on global challenges that threatened individuals and 
communities, human security has gone beyond being a “new” alternative concept 
of security to one that is critically important in an era of global power transition 
and uncertainties.
ASEAN and the wider East Asian region comprise one of the key nodes 
in this changing global landscape. Having been at the center of many of the 
human security crises that have taken place in the last 15 years, the region has 
had to seriously reassess its security concepts and approaches. Therefore, the 
adoption of an ASEAN Political and Security Community is but one of the many 
manifestations of the kind of security rethinking that is ongoing in Southeast 
Asia. As the region becomes more engaged with, and integrated into, the global 
community, there will be more compelling reasons for states to be imbued 
with the political will to work collaboratively in addressing complex human 
insecurities.  
Indeed, given the breadth and depth of an increasingly interconnected world, 
the regional and the global community will need to be infused with new thinking 
on how best to promote and advance human security—more decisively, more 
boldly. This requires no less than a renewed compact on human security. Thus, 
15 years after the Lysøen Declaration, a renewed compact on human security 
should aim to bring together a range of actors, extending beyond states to include 
civil society groups and other constituencies, to craft new pathways for effective 
international collaboration and cooperation for addressing 21st century threats to 
human security. 
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Notes
1. The network comprises Austria, Canada, Chile, Costa Rica, Greece, Ireland, Jordan, 
Mali, the Netherlands, Norway, Slovenia, South Africa (observer), Switzerland, and 
Thailand. Lloyd Axworthy (Canada) and Knut Vollebaek (Norway) started the Human 
Security Network (HSN) with the Lysøen Declaration (1998) which committed its 
members to a “framework for consultation and concerted action in the areas enhancing 
human security, promoting human rights, strengthening humanitarian law, preventing 
conflict and fostering democracy and good governance.” See: http://www.mzz.gov.si/en/
foreign_policy/foreign_policy/human_security_network_hsn/ (accessed December 10, 
2013).
2. The Commission on Human Security brought together twelve prominent 
international figures, including Mrs. Sadako Ogata (former UN High Commissioner for 
Refugees) and Professor Amartya Sen (1998 Nobel Laureat in Economics). Surin Pitsuwan 
served as one of the Commissioners. 
3. The ASEAN Political-Security Community (APSC) also provides for the 
establishment of an early warning mechanism in ASEAN to prevent conflict, and to 
promote and protect human rights, in the shape of the ASEAN Intergovernmental 
Commission on Human Rights (AICHR) (ASEAN 2009).
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